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Abstract: Some applications are using images instead of words as the user’s authentication secret, in order to 
increase the number of possible keys (key’s space), taking advantage of the several possibilities for each mouse 
click and of the fact that humans memorize images better then words. This paper presents the characterisation of 
the graphical keys chosen by almost 200 regular users of a website and the results show some important fact that 
must taken into account to maximize the security of the authentication process. 
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Introduction 
 
The information provided by the arrested technological experts connected to terrorist 
groups resulted in the knowledge that these organizations are using the Web to communicate. 
Even more, the software found in their laptops showed that they are also involved in hacking 
activities, what can be seen as expectable once modern societies depend more and more on 
the stability of their technological infrastructures. So we need more reliable processes of 
authentication, the process of confirming an alleged identity. This differs from the 
identification process in which a user is linked to a known identity [Magalhães, 2005A]. In 
the Information Systems, authentication involves, traditionally, sharing a secret with the 
authenticating entity and presenting it whenever a confirmation of the user’s identity is 
needed. In the digital era that secret is commonly a username/password pair and/or, 
sometimes, a biometric feature, both presenting difficulties of different kinds once the 
traditional pair user/password is no longer enough to protect these infrastructures, the privacy 
of those who use it and the confidentiality of the information (many of our countries secrets 
are hidden behind passwords), having known vulnerabilities, and the second has many issues 
related to ethical and social implications of its use [Magalhães, 2005B].   
 Password vulnerabilities come from their misuse that, in turn, results from the fact 
that they need to be both easy to remember, therefore simple, and secure, therefore complex. 
Consequently, it is virtually impossible to come up with a “good” password [Wiedenbeck, 
2005]. On the other hand, once users have not yet completely realized the need for securing 
their authentication secrets, even fairly good passwords become a threat when the security 
policies (if at all existing) fail to be implemented. The results of an inquiry made by the 
authors in 2004 to sixty Information Technology (IT) professionals show that, even among 
those that have technical knowledge, the need for passwords security is underestimated.  
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Table 1 - The distribution of the passwords constitution shows a generalized vulnerability 
Constitution of the passwords Percentage of users 
Letters and symbols 0% 
Numbers and symbols 0% 
Letters, numbers and symbols 17% 
Only letters 23% 
Only numbers 17% 
Letters and numbers 43% 
Number of persons that know one of the user's 
passwords
48%
32%
13%
7%
Zero
One
Two
Three or more
s Figure 1 - Users have a generalized tendency to share their passwordPasswords change frequency
5%
0%
23%
42%
30% At least once a month
Once each trimester
Once each semester
Almost never
Never
Figure 2 - Most of the users rarely change their passwords 
As shown in the table 1, only 17% of the inquired professionals use complex codes 
mbols, and 72% stated that they rarely change their acces
m know that at least one of those is known by at least one other person 
plicity and the principle of trust that allo
laced under the keyboard or even on the m
e stopped by graphical secrets (passgraphs), once they
er [Nelson, 1977] [Madigan, 1983], they can generate comp
 easy compatibility with existing systems) and they are diffi
person to person. This need to stop the transmissibility of the authenti
 we realize (Figure 3) that most professional users (65%) have only one or two 
including sy s codes (Figure 1), 
despite 52% of the
(Figure 2). This need for sim ws a user to have the 
password on a post-it p onitor, creates a security 
breach that can b  are easier to 
rememb lex passwords (an easy 
way to assure cult to transmit from 
cation secrets is even 
bigger when
codes that they use for authenticating to the generality of the used services.  
s are, like virtual 
keyboa
Needless to say that the authentication processes based on passgraph
rds, adequate for use in private spaces or in small devices like the Personal Digital 
Assistants (PDAs), once they are vulnerable to eyesdroping. Giving to the user the possibility 
to choose at each login attempt between the passgraph mode and the password mode is also 
not a choice, once the system would inherit the vulnerabilities of both systems. So, the only 
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way to implement this systems without limiting the users is to allow the user a choice 
Greg Blonder was the first to describe graphical passwords [Blonder, 1996], 
present
ng the most popular graphical authentication systems we find Passfaces  from 
the Pas
The Déjà Vu Scheme in which a matrix of m images is set, where n images are part of 
the use
ret (DAS) scheme is a graphical authentication system with an 
approa
set of t
Number of passwords frequently used
42%
23%
35%
One Two Three or more
Figure 3 - Most of the users use the same password for accessing all services 
between one of the processes when he uses the system for the first time (enrolment) and 
making that choice definitive (or almost). In this case, the user must be educated for the 
advantages and disadvantages of both systems so that he can make the choice that best suites 
is needs. In order to provide a useful widespread of passqraph systems they cannot generate 
new vulnerabilities. For this, it is essential that we can understand the users choices, so that 
we can use images that will maximize the entropy of the passgraph. This is, that will have 
regions with a probability of being chosen similar to the one resulting of a random choice. 
This paper presents a contribution to this knowledge of the users behaviour.  
 
Previous work on passgraphs 
 
ing in a United States Patent a system that would allow users to choose their picture, 
the number of regions to be clicked, their size and position. Since then, many variations of 
this system were presented and images have gained their way into the authentication 
processes.  
Amo TM
sfaces Corporation, a commercial system were the user chooses a previously selected 
face from a set of faces and repeats this process for different faces in different sets for a 
defined number of times [PassfacesTM, 2005], but popular doesn’t imply secure and a study of 
the users choices demonstrated that they are, in some cases, similar for all users. For instance, 
10% of the passwords of males could have been guessed with only two attempts [Davies, 
2004]. 
r’s portfolio, previously chosen from a set of proposed images. The user must identify 
those n images to login. 
The Draw A Sec
ch completely different. In DAS the user draws something over a grid and that 
becomes is authentication secret. This system has been implemented with success in PDAs 
and further studies will be made to analyse the user’s choices and acceptance [Jermyn, 1999].  
In the Visual Identification Protocol (VIP) several possibilities were created. From a 
en predefined images the user chooses four, placed on the same place and typed in the 
same order (VIP1) or placed in random positions (VIP2). VIP3 is a process where four of the 
eight images existing in the user’s portfolio are displayed along with 12 distractors and the 
user must identify them in no particular order.  The studies shown that the most common 
 3
errors associated with VIP1 and VIP2 were related with bad sequences, when the identified 
images are correct but selected on the wrong order, and in VIP3 most of the errors were due 
to wrong identification of the images, for instance any flower being consider as “the” chosen 
flower [de Angeli, 2003]. 
 
Description of the implemented system 
Considering that the PDA is the technology that provides an environment that better 
takes a
e 
login p
Both the enrolment and the authentication environment consist on a window with a 
field fo
 
dvantage of the graphical authentication procedures and that the Word Wide Web is 
the most used distributed system, our system was designed to meet the authentication 
demands of a Mobile Web Service, especially web pages destined to be browsed in PDAs.  
In order to test the authentication process in a real life situation we transformed th
rocedure of the site of a graduation course normally protected by password, for 
copyright reasons and to protect the privacy of the students in matters like their grades, into a 
system protected by passgraphs. We use the Web Application Server PE 8, from SUN, for a 
regular file realm authentication invoked through a hidden field in a regular form. The 
created environment feeds this field with a string that results from the application of a 
function to the passgraph data. The security issues were then addressed in the same way that 
for a regular username/password authenticated site.  
Figure 4 - The enrolment and authentication window 
r a username, in this case the student number; a dialog panel, where the users get 
feedback from the system; and a select panel, where the user can choose the active image 
from a previously defined set. Each image includes a grid in which each area can be seen as a 
pair (letter, number) once the first line has the letters from A to T and the firs column has the 
numbers from 1 to 14 and the letter A in the first position, equivalent to the line zero (Figure 
4). This configuration was chosen in order to find out if the users would prefer a password 
scheme, instead of a graphical scheme. If this is so, the user will just pick a sequence of 
letters. On the other hand, this can also be used (with a full alphabet) for entering the 
username without the use of an external keyboard (virtual or physical). The user chooses an 
authentication secret by clicking on several points of the active image, which can be changed 
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at any time. The sequence of the picked points in the chosen images will be the authentication 
key for future logins. Once we are trying to fully understand the users free choices, no 
limitations were imposed to the length of the passgraph. In the dialog panel the symbol * 
appears whenever the user selects a region of the image, allowing it to know if he did in fact 
clicked or if he accidentally clicked twice. In this way we’ll be able to reduce the number of 
login errors due to accidental clicks. In the final enrolment implementation, this panel will 
also transmit information about the limitations that will be made to the length of the 
passgraph. 
Figure 5 – The x and y axes on the four used images 
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 The use of several images creates a third dimension factor once a passgraph with 
le n will be a vector of the type (pngth 1, p2,…, pn) where, considering I as the set of available 
images,  { }I#1   ,130  ,190|),,( ≤≤≤≤≤≤∈ zyxzyxp . The values of x and y define the 
selected s shown in Figure 5 for a set of four 
images (the ones used in our implementation).  
 
ection in a specific two-dimensional image, as 
xperimental results 
In this section we present the practical results of this experiment, made on the 173 
users c
an conclude that most of the users, almost two thirds, choose the 
first av
E
 
hoices of passgraphs. In order to have the users free choices, and therefore understand 
what are the users wills and derive a set of rules for future implementations, no limitations 
were imposed to the users. 
From Figure 6 we c
ailable image and that the lower an image gets in the picking lists the lower the 
probability of being chosen, reducing the entropy of the system once the ideal situation would 
be that every image would have the same probability. Being so, it’s advisable that the images 
are presented to then users in a random order, both in the enrolment and in the authentication 
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processes. Also reflecting some laziness of the users is the fact that there were no users 
choosing a passgraph with clicks in different images. Unfortunately, we found no technical 
solution for this and, probably the way to improve these results is to educate the users.  
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Figure 6 - Users tend to choose the images that are first presented to them 
21%
13%
16%
20%
9% 11%
2% 3% 4%
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
%
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Number of clicks
ngth of the choosen passgraphsLe
Figure 7 – 50% of the passgraphs have less then four clicks. 
The average length of the chosen passgraphs is 3.9 clicks with 21% of the users 
having a passgraph constituted by only one click. This is clearly not enough and, therefore, 
our first rule for future implementations is that we must impose a minimum length in order to 
avoid the generalized vulnerability resultant from a widespread of short passgraphs. But, to 
force too many users to accept a passgraph bigger than the preferred one would generate a 
low acceptance of the system by the users, we consider that, al least in a first stage, we must 
define the minimum length in the size that will force 50% of the users to choose bigger 
passgraphs, this is (Figure 7), the minimum length will be set in 4 clicks.  
Table 2 – Passgraphs constituted by numbers, characters or regions in the second line (right 
bellow the characters) are frequently found. 
 
Percentage of the users 
choices (%) 
Passgraphs constituted exclusively by characters 6.36% 
Passgraphs constituted exclusively by numbers 2.89% 
Passgraphs constituted exclusively by regions in the line bellow the letters 10.98% 
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 An interesting fact found in the users choices, for us unexpected, is the amazing 
percentage of users with passgraphs constituted by regions in the same line or in the same 
column. Over three quarters of the passgraphs (75.9%) are in one of these conditions, 55.5% 
with all the selected regions in the same line and 20.4% with all the selected regions in the 
same column. This tendency is even bigger in what concerns to the first column (passgraphs 
constituted exclusively by numbers) and to the first two lines, the one constituted by letters 
and the one right bellow (Table 2). This tendency can be contradicted a simple rule: the 
system must reject passgraphs that are constituted by regions in the same line or in the same 
column. This will force the users to navigate in the image and, therefore, increase the entropy 
of the chosen passgraphs.  
Table 3 – The most common selected regions probability 
 Expectable if randomActual percentage 
Regions in the line bellow the letters 6.67% 39.94% 
Corners 2.11% 13.12% 
Eyes 0.83% 9.18% 
Letters 6.67% 10.06% 
Numbers 5.26% 6.56% 
 
Finally, as shown in the Table 3, we found that, besides the already solved tendencies 
like the letters or the regions in the line bellow them, some parts of the body are more chosen, 
the eyes, while others aren’t, like the nose or the mouth. In fact, the probability of an eye 
region to be chosen (9.18%) is eleven times bigger than expected. This can only be solved by 
eliminating humans from the selected images or, in opposition, by using images that present 
so many eyes that the probability is dissolved between all of them. By looking at the Table 3 
we also verify that the regions that are placed in corners are six times more chosen than 
expected if the distribution was random. So the images must be cut in a round way and they 
shouldn’t represent objects with corners. All things considered we find that nature images are 
probably the most appealing for a safe use of passgraphs. 
 
Conclusions  
 
The main objective of the implementation of this system was to understand the users 
choices of images and of regions inside the images. The results show that the users have a 
common tendency to choose the first available images and that the use of images with corners 
and the existence of letters, placed in a row, creates serious vulnerabilities to the system. The 
eyes are also a common choice and should also be avoided. Therefore, the results suggest the 
use of images without corners, like natures, cut in a round form. In order to keep the letters, 
once they increase in a considerable way the comfort of use in PDAs, they must be placed in 
a random way throughout the images. Another dangerous tendency is the use of passgraphs 
constituted by regions placed in the same row or in the same column, therefore the system 
must reject the choice of passgraphs that meet this criteria, forcing the users to navigate 
inside the image by demanding the use of, at least, two different rows and two different 
columns. Passgraph systems have shown that they have potential to substitute, or 
complement, password systems but it is shown that, for that to happen, the web programmers 
must choose adequate images and implement the correct security policies. 
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